这是 Sam Bankman-Fried 发给 FTX 员工的道歉信：“当糟糕的事情发生在我们身上时，我们都倾向于做出不合理的决定”
2022 年 11 月 23 日星期三发布
阅读 Bankman-Fried 的完整信函
“大家好-
我对发生的事情深感抱歉。我对发生在你们所有人身上的事感到遗憾。我对发生在客户身上的事情感到遗憾。你为 FTX 付出了一切，并支持公司和我。
我不是故意让这一切发生的，我愿意付出任何代价，以便能够回去重新做事。你是我的家人。我把它弄丢了，我们的老家是一个空荡荡的显示器仓库。当我转身时，已经没有人可以说话了。我让你们所有人都失望了，当事情破裂时，我无法沟通。面对压力、泄密和币安 LOI，我愣住了，什么也没说。在公司发展的喧嚣中，我忘记了最重要的事情。我非常关心你们所有人，你们是我的家人，我很抱歉。
我是首席执行官，所以我有责任确保最终在 FTX 发生正确的事情。我希望我当时更加小心。
我想给你一个关于发生的事情的更好的描述——我应该尽早写出我对它的最佳理解。
最近把事情拼凑起来，做出近似值——我现在没有完整的数据访问权限来获得准确的答案——并将所有东西都标记为市场，而不考虑流动性，我相信导致本月崩溃的事件包括：
1) 今年春天市场崩盘导致抵押品价值下降约 50%；
一个。~$60b 抵押品，~$2b 负债 -> ~$30b 抵押品，~$2b 负债
2）行业大部分信贷一下子枯竭；
一个。~$25b 抵押品，~$8b 负债
3) 11 月一次集中的、超相关的崩盘导致抵押品价值在很短的时间内再次下跌约 50%，在此期间市场投标方的流动性非常少；
一个。~$17b 抵押品，~8b 负债
4) 11 月同样的攻击引发了银行挤兑；
一个。~$9b 抵押品
5) 当我们疯狂地把所有东西放在一起时，很明显这个头寸比它在管理员/用户上显示的要大，因为在 FTX 有银行账户之前有旧的法定存款：
一个。~$9b 抵押品，~$8b 负债
我从没想过这会发生。我没有意识到保证金头寸的全部范围，也没有意识到超相关崩盘所带来的风险的大小。贷款和二次销售通常用于对业务进行再投资——包括收购币安——而不是用于大量个人消费。
我对我的监督失败深表遗憾。回想起来，我希望我们能以不同的方式做很多事情。举几个例子：
a) 对大额保证金持仓持怀疑态度
b) 检查涉及超相关崩溃和银行同时运行的压力测试场景
c) 对 FTX 上的法币流程更加谨慎
d) 持续监控总可交付资产、总客户头寸和其他核心风险指标
e) 加强对保证金管理的控制。
这一切都没有改变这样一个事实，即这一切对你们来说都很糟糕，这不是你们的错，对此我真的很抱歉。我将尽我所能来补偿你们——以及客户——即使这会占用我的余生。但我担心即使那样我也做不到。
我还想感谢你们中的那些人，他们给了我我现在认为是崩溃后 FTX 前进道路的正确建议。当然，你是对的：我相信一个月前 FTX 还是一个欣欣向荣、盈利丰厚的创新企业。这意味着 FTX 仍然具有价值，并且该价值本可以用于帮助每个人变得更加完整。我们本可以筹集到大量资金；在我签署第 11 章文档后的大约八分钟内，潜在的数十亿美元资金就出现了。在这些资金、公司仍持有的数十亿美元抵押品以及我们从其他方收到的利息之间，我认为我们可能可以向客户返还大量价值并挽救业务。
当然，必须做出改变：提高透明度，实施更多控制，包括对我自己的监督。但是 FTX 真的很特别，你们都帮助做到了这一点。发生的一切都不是你的错。我们不得不很快做出非常艰难的决定。我以前也有过这样的经历，早该知道当糟糕的事情发生在我们身上时，我们都会做出不理智的决定。出于绝望，巨大的协调压力来了，要求为所有 FTX 申请破产——即使是有偿付能力的实体——并且不顾其他司法管辖区的索赔。我理解这种压力并对此表示同情；许多人被迫陷入通常不是他们的错的具有挑战性的环境。我不情愿地屈服于这种压力，即使我早该知道；
也许还有机会挽救公司。我相信新投资者有数十亿美元的真正兴趣可以让客户变得完整。但我不能向你保证任何事情都会发生，因为这不是我的选择。与此同时，我很高兴看到正在采取一些积极的步骤，比如重新启动 LedgerX。
我非常感谢你们多年来为 FTX 所做的一切，我永远不会忘记这一点。
——SBF”
Read Bankman-Fried’s full letter
“Hi all—
I feel deeply sorry about what happened. I regret what happened to all of you. And I regret what happened to customers. You gave everything you could for FTX, and stood by the company—and me.
I didn’t mean for any of this to happen, and I would give anything to be able to go back and do things over again. You were my family. I’ve lost that, and our old home is an empty warehouse of monitors. When I turn around, there’s no one left to talk to. I disappointed all of you, and when things broke down I failed to communicate. I froze up in the face of pressure and leaks and the Binance LOI and said nothing. I lost track of the most important things in the commotion of company growth. I care deeply about you all, and you were my family, and I’m sorry.
I was CEO, and so it was my duty to make sure that, ultimately, the right things happened at FTX. I wish that I had been more careful.
I want to give you a better description of what happened—one I should have written out as best I understood it much earlier.
Piecing things together recently, making approximations—I don’t have full data access right now to get precise answers—and marking everything to market, regardless of liquidity, I believe that the events that led to the breakdown this month included:
1) A crash in markets this spring that led to a roughly 50% reduction in the value of collateral;
a. ~$60b collateral, ~$2b liabilities -> ~$30b collateral, ~$2b liabilities
2) Most of the credit in the industry drying up at once;
a. ~$25b collateral, ~$8b liabilities
3) A concentrated, hyper-correlated crash in November that led to another roughly 50% reduction in the value of collateral over a very short period of time, during which there was very little market bid-side liquidity;
a. ~$17b collateral, ~8b liabilities
4) A run on the bank triggered by the same attacks in November;
a. ~$9b collateral
5) As we frantically put everything together, it became clear that the position was larger than its display on admin/users, because of old fiat deposits before FTX had bank accounts:
a. ~$9b collateral, ~$8b liabilities
I never intended this to happen. I did not realize the full extent of the margin position, nor did I realize the magnitude of the risk posed by a hyper-correlated crash. The loans and secondary sales were generally used to reinvest in the business—including buying out Binance—and not for large amounts of personal consumption.
I deeply regret my oversight failure. In retrospect, I wish that we had done many many things differently. To name a few:
a) being substantially more skeptical of large margin positions
b) examining stress test scenarios involving hyper-correlated crashes and simultaneous runs on the bank
c) being more careful about the fiat processes on FTX
d) having a continuous monitor of total deliverable assets, total customer positions, and other core risk metrics
e) Putting in more controls around margin management.
And none of this changes the fact that this all sucks for you guys, and it’s not your fault, and I’m really sorry about that. I’m going to do what I can to make it up to you guys—and to the customers—even if that takes the rest of my life. But I’m worried that even then I won’t be able to.
I also want to acknowledge those of you who gave me what I now believe to be the right advice about pathways forward for FTX following the crash. You were right, of course: I believe that a month earlier FTX had been a thriving, profitable, innovative business. Which means that FTX still had value, and that value could have gone towards helping to make everyone more whole. We likely could have raised significant funding; potential interest in billions of dollars of funding came in roughly eight minutes after I signed the Chapter 11 docs. Between those funds, the billions of dollars of collateral the company still held, and the interest we’d received from other parties, I think that we probably could have returned large value to customers and saved the business.
There would have had to be changes, of course: way more transparency, and way more controls in place, including oversight of myself. But FTX was something really special, and you all helped make it that. Nothing that happened was your fault. We had to make very hard calls very quickly. I have been in that position before, and should have known that when shitty things happen to us, we all tend to make irrational decisions. An extreme amount of coordinated pressure came, out of desperation, to file for bankruptcy for all of FTX—even entities that were solvent—and despite other jurisdictions’ claims. I understand that pressure and empathize with it; a lot of people had been thrust into challenging circumstances that generally were not their fault. I reluctantly gave in to that pressure, even though I should have known better; I wish I had listened to those of you who saw and still see value in the platform, which was and is my belief as well.
Maybe there still is a chance to save the company. I believe that there are billions of dollars of genuine interest from new investors that could go to making customers whole. But I can’t promise you that anything will happen, because it’s not my choice. In the meantime, I’m excited to see some positive steps being taken, like LedgerX being turned back on.
I’m incredibly thankful for all that you guys have done for FTX over the years, and I’ll never forget that.
—SBF”
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